Introduction
One of the most important themes in the grand narrative of the emergence of EU law as the supreme law of EU-land, prevailing over national legal systems, is (what may be called generically) a Solange story: a story about national constitutional courts resisting a straightforward surrender of national legal sovereignties, and insisting on their own role as guardians of any further transfer of powers from the national to the European level. This resistance is based on their distrust both of the democratic legitimacy at the supra-national level, and of the EU's ability to provide a degree of protection of the principles of the rule of law and human rights, at least equivalent to that of the most elevated standards of the relevant national communities. ensuring an effective protection of fundamental rights, the Federal Constitution Court would * Professor in the Department of Law, European University Institute, Florence, and in the Faculty of Law, University of Sydney. I am grateful to Kasia Lach and Sara Dezalay, as well as to a number of other colleagues whose advice is acknowledged in the relevant parts of the text below. 1 I need to emphasize that the description provided is extremely stylized, and fails to record the subtleties and complexities of developments of the attitudes of various constitutional courts of the "old Europe" towards the supremacy of EC/EU law. After Solange-1 and Solange-2, mentioned in the text above, the German Federal Constitutional Court adopted a number of other extremely important decisions, which can be seen as belonging to the same tendency, with some apparently departing from the position reached in Solange-2, in particular the Maastricht Treaty Case, 89 BVerfGE 155 (1993) , where the German Court established that it would control observance by Community institutions of the Treaty-based limits to their powers, and the compatibility of Community law with the fundamentals of the German Constitution. This is all very well described in the literature (see, e.g., Bruno European level". 10 I had described various ways in which lawyers and politicians in these countries tried to justify the preservation of the full sovereignty of their country even as a fully-fledged member of the EU, e.g. by drawing the distinction between sovereignty as such and the exercise of sovereign powers, by redefining the EU as a traditional international organization, etc. 11 However, while these devices were more ingenious than compelling, the fact remained that concerns centered around the preservation of sovereignty were quite strongly heard in political discourses in CEE around the time of accession to the EU. 12 The constitutional courts thus found themselves in a situation in which the pull towards rephrasing sovereignty-based objections against the supremacy of EU law, in terms of their role as guardians of constitutional values, was irresistible, and certainly much stronger than in the case of their West European counterparts, which could feel much more relaxed about sovereignty in the EU. Indeed, the founding members of the EU (where the original Solange phenomenon prefigured what is now going on in some of the new Member States) were not the sites of any particularly strong concerns about preserving sovereignty within a supranational polity, which they themselves had brought into being in the first place. So while the Solange process could have occurred there, it subsequently found all the more fertile ground in the sovereignty-starved countries of CEE, affected by the additional, possibly humiliating factor of having to join the EU on a "take it or leave it" basis, where the impossibility to meaningfully alter the existing rules of the game exacerbated their sovereignty concerns.
As is clear from the above introductory remarks, the reasons for the willingness by the constitutional courts of a number of the new Member States to replay the Solange story in their own States after accession to the EU are almost entirely related to their domestic, both political and legal, context: they have less to do with the EU and more with purely local credentials, and after several decades of an authoritarian, non-democratic and non-rightsrespecting rule, CEE countries had to undergo a rebuilding of democratic, constitutional regimes through a difficult, painful process of trial-and-error, against a background of economic collapse, disaffected citizenry, and incompetent and corruption-prone public service, judiciary and politicians. Joining first the Council of Europe and subsequently the EU was seen as, among other things, the best way of making democracy irreversible and robust, with political conditionality viewed as the best democracy-learning process, and full membership as the guarantee of the resilience of democratic achievements. 13 This was, one should add, both an external and an internal perception. Externally, EU enlargement was perceived, inter alia, as the best form of democracy promotion within a region of weak democratic credentials, where any collapse into authoritarian, nationalistic rule could upset the peaceful balance within the entire continent. Internally, EU membership has always been viewed by the democratic and liberal forces within the candidate (and the new Member-)
States as the strongest backup for democratic processes and for the protection of human rights. The case of Slovakia, under President Meciar (whose policy endangered the aspirations for a quick membership to the EU) or, more recently, that of Poland under the rule of President Lech Kaczynski, show the efficiency of the "return to Europe" rhetoric as a strategy of opposing potentially authoritarian tendencies at the domestic level. In the Polish context, for instance, the "Europe will not allow this" rhetoric became an effective and powerful argument in the struggle led by the opposition against the pull of the Polish political elite towards breaching the right of assembly, or placing the question of a restoration of the death penalty on the political agenda, and so forth. And, while much of the pro-democratic arguments could not be properly linked to EU law as such, the very fact of membership inthe EU facilitated greatly the strategies available to the defenders of democratic and civil rights.
The Polish Constitutional Tribunal has been at the forefront of this line of argument.
14 So it would be truly ironic if the constitutional courts were now to build democracy-based arguments against the supremacy of EU law in new Member States. It would be perhaps even perverse if the courts of the very countries which entered the EU inter alia to consolidate their democracy and human rights protection were to erect barriers against a smooth integration 13 For further developments on this point, see Wojciech Sadurski, "Accession's Democracy Dividend:
The Impact of the EU Enlargement upon Democracy in the New Member States of Central and Eastern Europe", European Law Journal 10 (2004): 371-401. 14 See, inter alia, the decisions referred to in the concluding section of this paper.
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within the EU legal framework on the basis of their uncertainty as to the outcome, both in terms of democratic-and rights-protection, of such an integration (i.e., of the supremacy of EU law over national constitutional laws). The EU is thus perceived both as a source for the promotion of democracy and as a threat to democracy (through a transfer of powers to European institutions, whose democratic legitimacy is put in doubt): here is the paradox which underlies the story developed in this article.
This paradox lies at the heart of the Solange story, chapter 3. The first two chapters of this chain novel were written within old Member States, with constitutional courts first questioning the supremacy of European law out of fundamental-rights concerns, and then affording a conditional imprimatur to supremacy, justified by the fact that the protection of rights at the EU level had reached standards equivalent to those required at the national level. 15 The third chapter is now being written in the Eastern parts of the EU. But here is an additional irony. The initial concerns put forward by the German or the Italian courts back in the 1970s ("Chapter 1" of Solange) were eventually dispelled, based on the fact that the protection of rights by the EU had reached a satisfactory level ("Chapter 2"). Thus, the CEE constitutional courts entering the scene as the subsequent authors of the same serial novel, with a claim that they now have to protect their citizens from the erosion of their rights protection (an erosion resulting, as the argument goes, from the supremacy of EU law over national constitutional orders), appears like a return to Chapter 1, while we have already been through Chapter 2. This is the double irony.
And yet, despite the apparent improbability -due to the double irony just noted -of "Chapter 3", it is now being written, and its co-authors are the three by far most activist and powerful constitutional courts in CEE: that of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. These are respectable, eminent authors, with strong audiences and sympathetic reviewers, and they are likely to be followed by others. Their contribution to the majestic narrative of Solange is rather complex and somewhat confusing. They speak with different voices and their concerns are not exactly the same, but the cumulative effect of their respective discourses leads to the conclusion that the Solange story, begun some thirty years ago, is alive and well, and that the last chapter has not yet been written.
. The CCC was asked by a group of deputies of the Czech Parliament to review the constitutionality of a number of provisions of Governmental Regulation "Laying Down certain Conditions for the Implementation of Measures of the Common Organization of the Markets in the Sugar Sector". The contested provisions dealt with the way in which the allocation process of production quotas for sugar producers had been established. The CCC annulled the challenged provision of the regulation on the basis that the Government had exercised a power which had already been transferred to the European Community.
Solange in
According to the CCC, Community law was directly applicable and there was no legal basis for a national law transposing the Commission's regulation into the Czech national legal order.
The importance of this decision for the theme of this paper lies in the fact that the Court engaged in an open, explicit discussion of the role of democratic principles, in the context of accession to the EU. There were two types of reference to democracy, or more specifically, the constitutional principle of the "democratic law-based State". 17 Firstly, it was invoked when the CCC discussed possible limitations to the acceptance of the Community law principles of direct effect and supremacy. Secondly, the CCC invoked the principle, whilst explaining the limitations of the powers of national organs in areas in which competences have been delegated to the European Communities.
Regarding the first aspect, i.e. the interpretation of the supremacy and direct effect of Community legal norms, the Court emphasized, in a distinctly "Euro-friendly" manner, that "Community law norms enjoy application precedence over the legal order of Member States of the EC". 18 In this particular case, the matter belonged clearly to the competence of the Community, and the Court found itself not competent to assess the validity of such a norm: it 16 Article 9 para 2 and 3 of the Czech Constitution. 17 There is also a third aspect, which played a more marginal role in the judgment, where the Court referred to democracy, by invoking the principle of stare decisis (or, as the Court called it, the continuity of its own case law, see Part A3. In this Part, the Court considered whether it is bound by its earlier decision which considered the relationship between production quotas and the principle of equality, but this precedent was found not to be operative in the present case. 18 Decision Pl. ÚS 50/04, Part VI.
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pointed at the case law of the ECJ which clearly establishes that, when a matter is regulated solely by EU law, it takes precedence over national law, including over national constitutional law. The CCC did not contest this precedent.
19
The CCC acknowledged the fact that after the accession to the European Union a "fundamental change occurred within the Czech legal order" -that is, that Community law "will have an impact on formation, application, and interpretation" of national law. The Court went on to stress the fact that European law exerts a gravitational pull on the entire legal system, including its own constitutional law:
Although the Constitutional Court's referential framework has remained, even after 1 May 2004, the norms of the Czech Republic's constitutional order, the Constitutional Court cannot entirely overlook the impact of Community law on the formation, application, and interpretation of national law, all the more so in a field of law where the creation, operation, and aim of its provisions is immediately bound up with Community law. In other words, in this field the Constitutional Court interprets constitutional law taking into account the principles arising from Community law.
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So much for the Euro-friendly aspect. On the other hand, the Court added that Community legal norms cannot be in conflict with the principle of the democratic law-based State or that the interpretation of these factors may not lead to a threat to the democratic law-based State. Such a shift would come into conflict with Art. 9 para. 2, or Art. 9 para. 3 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic
21
In its reasoning, the CCC further developed its position on the relationship between national and Community law, and the CCC's powers to assess the constitutional conformity of national legal norms that are "tied up" with Community law. As we already saw, the CCC, as a general rule, accepted the supremacy doctrine and the fact that it lacked competence to asses the validity of Community law norms. At the same time, however, referring to the practice of several high courts of other Member States, 22 it pointed out that Community norms have been 9 refused precedence on certain occasions and that the Courts have "retained a certain reserve to interpret principles such as the democratic law-based State and the protection of fundamental rights".
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Later the CCC stressed:
The Constitutional Court also considers it necessary to emphasize that the holding it now adopts in no way signifies that the Constitutional Court would abdicate its powers of constitutional review of national legal enactments which are complementary to Community law, as has been done by several courts of EC Member States.
24
The second type of appeals to the principle of democracy was in a section of the decision explaining the ways in which the government exceeded its powers. By adopting the contested provisions of the government regulation, which merely paraphrased provisions of the Commission regulation, the government failed to observe that upon the accession of the Czech Republic to the EU, some of the powers of the national organs had been transferred to the supra-national organs of the EU. This transfer, the Court emphasized, "has taken place on the basis of Art. 10a of the Constitution" -i.e., the provision authorizing the transfer of powers to the EU. This statement was followed by a lengthy explanation of the nature of the delegation of powers, and it is at this point that the Court engaged in an argument that is of particular interest to us here, making a thinly veiled warning about the terms under which such a transfer of powers is to be deemed acceptable, or, on the contrary, the conditions according to which it can be withheld, as well as establishing itself (although only implicitly)
as the guardian charged with assessing whether the terms of the transfer are respected.
According to the CCC, the delegation of powers is conditional upon the powers being exercised in a manner that not only is compatible with the preservation of State sovereignty, but also does not pose a threat to the very essence of the law-based State:
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Should one of these conditions for the transfer of powers cease to be fulfilled, that is, should developments in the EC, or the EU, threaten the very essence of State sovereignty of the Czech Republic or the essential attributes of a democratic State governed by the rule of law, it will be necessary to insist that these powers be once again taken up by the Czech Republic's State bodies.
26
This point was deemed significant enough to be repeated by the Court: should the delegated powers be exercised in a way that is 'regressive in relation to the existing conception of the retained a certain reserve to interpret principles such as the democratic law-based state and the protection of fundamental rights", Part VI of the Decision. 23 Part VI. 24 Part VI. 25 Part VI. 26 Part VI.
essential attributes of a democratic law-based State', 27 they will be again assumed by the national organs of the Czech Republic. As this had not occurred in the present case, the Court was comfortable about invalidating the governmental regulation, clearly expressing its trust in the EU not exercising its powers in a manner "regressive" to the democracy and "law-based
State" (or the rule of law). The current standard for the protection of fundamental rights and basic freedoms within the Community was, the Court assessed, perfectly satisfactory and not "of a lower quality" than in the Czech Republic. There may be one point, in the regulation under assessment, in which there may have been a slight suspicion of discrimination in the way the regulation established production quotas, even under the Court's own case-law, but the Court refused in this instance to attach any significance to it, because it did "not consider itself authorized to assess measures which form a part of the Common Agricultural Policy in terms of their substance".
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The following general comments on this decision are of significance to our discussion. 
11
The sweetener is perhaps more obvious than the warning. Hungary, the President of the Republic, before signing the Act, submitted it to the Constitutional Court requesting a constitutional review, on the basis of alleged retroactivity.
The Court agreed and invalidated several provisions of the law.
It is striking that, in the judgment, the "European" dimension of the case is somewhat hidden, since the HCC chose to treat the issues involved as concerning only the application of national Hungarian law. But the fact is that the rules which were eventually struck down were identical to the transitional measures adopted in the Commission regulations in anticipation of 32 These aspects of the law gave the Court an opportunity to comment on its earlier jurisprudence on the principle of "legal certainty" and that of (as an essential part of the latter) non-retroactivity:
Legal certainty requires, among other things, the determination of citizens' rights and obligations in statutes promulgated in a way specified in an Act of Parliament and made accessible for everyone and, in addition, statutes may not define obligations for a time period preceding their promulgation, and no lawful act may be declared illegal with retroactive effect, in order to allow the recipients to adapt their conduct to the legal provisions they have access to.
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It went on to state that:
the principle of the rule of law requires the determination of the date of entry into force of a statute in a way allowing the persons concerned to become familiar with the statute, to prepare for its application, and to adapt to the new regulations. The time needed for preparation (i.e. the time between the promulgation and the entry into force of the statute) is to be determined on a case-by-case basis.
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There was one other aspect of the legislation which came under a critical scrutiny of the Court: it was the fact that the law delegated to an "implementing decree" the question of identifying the recipients and the amount of the sums to be paid with regards to surplus stocks as defined under the law. These payments were found by the Court to be equivalent to [4] the provisions of the ACSS challenged in the petition do not qualify as a translation or publication of the regulations of the Union, as they implement the aims of the regulations by using the tools of Hungarian law.
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These are meant to be the four formal reasons substantiating the conclusion that it is the validity of Hungarian law, rather than that of the European regulations, which is at stake here.
There seems, however, to be a set of odd non sequiturs. Arguments (2) and (3) seem, if anything, to support, rather than weaken, the thesis that the Court engages in the scrutiny of European law. Argument (4) states the conclusion rather than the reasoning. So only argument (1) might qualify as a real argument for the disconnection. But how convincing is it? On its face, it seems to ignore the fundamental trait of EU law, that is, that regulations have direct effect and are directly applicable within Member States. And it is clear that, in the present case, the regulations create obligations not just on Member States but also on individuals -e.g. the surplus owners. 40 But even if it were the case that the only obligations the regulations created were aimed at Member States, it still would be irrelevant to the So what can we make of the Court's attitude? Offhand, there are two possible readings of the Court's approach. The first is: the Court came across a deeply troubling defect in the law (troubling, especially, from the point of view of its earlier strong anti-retroactivity jurisprudence; this matter will be developed below) but in order not to appear un-cooperative with regards to Hungary's accession to the EU, it preferred to characterize its scrutiny as concerning exclusively domestic issues, thus avoiding making any gestures questioning the (putative) supremacy of European law over the Hungarian constitutional doctrines. 43 Second reading: the Court grasped the opportunity of establishing its own position as the umpire of the validity of European law, according to its own conceptions of democracy, but chose to minimize the friction and merely to send a signal according to which it will not accept any "foreign norms" which do not square with its own philosophy of the rule of law and 41 See, similarly, Uitz, "EU Law" at 48. 42 I am grateful to Bruno de Witte for discussions on this point. 43 As Andras Sajo puts it, while the Court "apparently avoided a head on collision", the strategy adopted "opens up the Court to criticisms of judicial hypocrisy", Sajo, "Learning Co-operative Constitutionalism", at 368. were not prosecuted for political reasons. 47 The President refused to sign the law and sent it to the Constitutional Court, which then declared it to be unconstitutional. In this judgment, referred to as the Zetenyi decision (after the abbreviated name of the law that was struck down), it based its decision partly on the unacceptable vagueness of the law, arguing that that the transition to democracy was carried out on the basis of legality, no distinction could be made by the Court between laws enacted before and after the new Constitution; every law must therefore conform to the Constitution and every law must be reviewed in the same way.
On this basis, the Court applied the principle of legal certainty -as a fundamental requirement of the rule of law -to the act suspending the statute of limitations, and found the law deficient in this regard; the law was held to be a form of retroactive legislation, and thus violating the rule of law.
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The decision was applauded by some as a case of a principled defence of constitutionalism against political imperatives, and derided by others as a formalistic insistence on continuity of certain earlier constitutional engagements, even though no substantive rationales usually produced for the "lex retro non agit" principle were relevant to this case. 50 Be that as it may, non-retroactivity became a favourite mantra (an uncharitable would say: obsession) of the Hungarian Constitutional Court, which it further extended into various non-criminal-law fields, resulting in a general doctrine according to which, when new obligations are created by statutes, there must be "enough time" given to the addressees of the rule, to prepare for its application, to adapt to the new regulations, and to adjust their conduct to the new requirements without facing negative consequences. 51 So it is no wonder that, when the opportunity arose to signal its proud history of a robust understanding of "legal certainty" against a European norm which could be faulted of this in this respect, the Court should jump on the opportunity, especially if it could do by avoiding an apparent challenge to European law, as opposed to national law.
But this sounds just a little too good to be true, and one cannot avoid the impression that the publication is formal or public enough to put all the stakeholders on notice and so forth, but no discussion of these points is carried out by the Court in this judgement. The fact that the Commission had published its regulations prior to their entry into force, as had the ministers with the publication of their communication, and that of the regulations as an annex, was flatly dismissed by the Court as "irrelevant". The conclusion of unconstitutionality is, under these circumstances, less than convincing.
The second thread of "path dependence" which paved the way to this decision concerns the Any provision ordering the direct applicability of internal public law norms of the Community in the Hungarian legal system, and in legal relations of a public law nature between the Hungarian state and the subjects of law under its sovereignty, violates Article 2 paras (1) and (2) of the Constitution.
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According to this reasoning, the answer was certainly unimpeachable. However, it also set a certain climate of sovereignty-assertion in the Court's doctrine, which was eventually asserted in its 2004 decision, and may be reiterated in the near future again. What is, however, even more important for our purposes here is that, back in 1998, the Court had used the opportunity to strictly link this assertion of sovereignty with the principle of democratic legitimacy: "It is a constitutional requirement based on the principles of popular sovereignty and the democratic rule of law that in the Hungarian Republic, public authority may only be exercised 59 Volkai at 31. 60 Uitz, "EU Law" at 49. tell", is probably unavoidable in this instance, in so far as both readings seem to be equally plausible, and only future decisions of the Court (when a "judicial comfort-seeking" 66 from the pre-accession context will no longer be available) will reveal which of these interpretations was more accurate.
For now, however, it is clear that the Court has avoided a head-on assault on the principle of supremacy of European law, but left itself enough room to do so in the future, when European regulations, directly applicable in Hungary, might be faulted as not satisfying the Court's standards of the rule of law. It was also a warning aimed at the European law-makers, about how seriously it takes its own understanding of legal certainty. But since it attacked a proxy (the Hungarian authorities), rather than the genuine sources of the norm at stake, it carefully avoided the need to pronounce itself on the limits of the supremacy of European law over the national constitutional order. The emphasis on national sovereignty is unmistakable, though:
even a Hungarian legal scholar who prefers to read this decision as not hostile to European supremacy, but as avoiding tackling the status of EU law altogether, notes "an odd emphasis on national sovereignty, temporal frameworks and an equally formalistic approach to retroactivity" 67 displayed in the decision of the Hungarian Court.
Poland
Exactly ten days after the formal accession of Poland, its Constitutional Tribunal issued a decision on the constitutionality of the Accession Treaty, 68 which was signed in Athens on 16 
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It is at this point that the link between national sovereignty and democracy is established:
Polish constitutional provisions, as emphasized by the Tribunal, "do not authorise the delegation of competences to such an extent that it would signify the inability of the Republic of Poland to continue functioning as a sovereign and democratic State". 73 This paves the way, naturally, for a reassertion of the primacy of Polish constitutional law over any norms issued by "international organisations", by virtue of the link between democracy and sovereignty, the latter being the guarantee for the former. The Tribunal does not need to state it in so many words but it is clear that, in response to the petitioners, the Tribunal reassures anyone fearing 69 As one Polish commentator observed, the Tribunal's reasoning was "based on fears" of "losing sovereignty, or not retaining 'enough' of it", Krystyna Kowalik. Then there is the thorny issue of the putative supremacy of European Community law over the domestic system; this supremacy is all the more likely as it is mandated not only by the doctrine developed within European law itself, but also because it has its mooring in the Polish Constitution: article 91 (3) provides that "If an agreement, ratified by the Republic of Poland, establishing an international organization so provides, the laws established by it shall be applied directly and have precedence in the event of a conflict of laws". Yes, the Tribunal concedes, but this "precedence" applies only to sub-constitutional laws, not to the Constitution itself (and, by implication, to the interpretation of the Constitution as given by the Constitutional Tribunal):
Given its supreme legal force (Article 8(1)), the Constitution enjoys precedence of binding force and precedence of application within the territory of the Republic of Poland. The precedence over statutes of the application of international agreements which were ratified on the basis of a statutory authorization or consent granted (in accordance with Article 90(3)) via the procedure of a nationwide referendum, as guaranteed by Article 91(2) of the Constitution, in no way signifies an analogous precedence of these agreements over the Constitution. In no event may [a Euro-friendly interpretation] lead to results contradicting the explicit wording of constitutional norms or being irreconcilable with the minimum guarantee functions realized by the Constitution. In particular, the norms of the Constitution within the field of individual rights and freedoms indicate a minimum and unsurpassable threshold which may not be lowered or questioned as a result of the introduction of Community provisions.
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Why would the Tribunal establish such an obiter, and hence, strictly speaking, unnecessary, warning? The only plausible reason is that it wanted, right at the outset of its functioning within the EU system, establish a Solange-like principle, defining its guardianship of the national-European law relationship, as an element of the fundamental rights standards of the national constitutional system it had itself set forth. 
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There is one tempting way of reading the decision, beyond the Solange-kind of interpretation which I have just suggested. There is a striking contrast between the tone and the outcome of the judgment. The outcome is unambiguously "Euro-friendly": all the complaints of the petitioners, a group of right-wing and nationalistic MPs, were rebutted, as constitutionally groundless. The complaints amounted to an all-out challenge to the political decision to join the EU; they were not about any particular legal subtlety pertaining to the primacy of European law or its direct applicability. There were no fewer than fourteen grounds for the constitutional challenge, with references to the Accession Treaty, the EC Treaty, the EU Treaty, and … the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and they ranged from the very fundamental principle of national sovereignty 82 to the, arguably idiotic, charge that "Europe" might impose same-sex marriages in Poland. 83 Nothing, in the long list of fears and paranoia of the Polish nationalist right, was too big or too small to escape the long catalogue of constitutional challenges inserted in the petition. The Court struck down each of the complaints, one by one. By doing so, it rescued, on the constitutional front, the historic choice made by the Polish people and by the centre-left political elite ruling at the time, to make Poland join the European Union.
This was the outcome of the judgment. The tone, however, was singularly "Europeunfriendly". The European Union characterized as a standard international organization;
transfers of powers to the EU viewed as an exercise of national sovereignty and only insofar as the essence of sovereignty remains untouched; unquestionable supremacy of the Polish constitution over European laws; limits to a "Euro-friendly" interpretation of the law determined by the concern for fundamental rights; sovereignty viewed as required for the protection of democracy; a contrast drawn between the regulative principles underlying the structure of a democratic State and, on the other hand, the structures of "international organisations" such as the EU: all these are cumulative components of a rationale, which in effect establishes the grounds for a strong sovereignty-based resistance to possible intrusions "from the outside" in the Polish democracy and rights-protection.
84 82 See the challenges discussed in points 1-11 of the Judgment. 83 See the challenge discussed in point 29 of the Judgment. 84 A similar analysis, pointing to the tension between the reasoning and the outcome, could be carried out also with respect to another decision of the Constitutional Tribunal taken soon after accession, namely the one concerning the compatibility of the elections to the European Parliament with the Polish Constitution, Decision K 15/04 of the 31 st of May 2004. The Tribunal found nothing unconstitutional about granting voting rights for the EP elections organized in Poland to EU citizens who were not Polish citizens, but on the road to this conclusion, it emphasized, inter alia, the very limited role of the European Parliament (Part III.2 and III.3 of the Decision) and the fact that the constituency of the EP is an aggregate body composed of the nations of the Member States (Part III.3).
This tension between the outcome and the tone of the judgment need not be seen as incoherence, though; to the contrary, their concomitance in the same judgment may be perfectly understandable. It may be viewed through the prism of what I have described elsewhere in some detail as the "strategy of reassurance" employed by a court, and which can be detected when there is a contrast between the argument and the outcome of a judicial decision. 85 Courts speak to several audiences at the same time, and they need to build, and maintain, their legitimacy by placating those who will be disappointed by the outcome of their decision (as some groups will necessarily be). They can do so in various ways: for instance, by sending a signal to the disappointed part of the audience that the decision is very narrow, or that at least that there are some aspects of the judgment which may raise hopes as to the decision going in a different direction in the future. By doing so, a Court can minimize the costs of creating "winners" and "losers", and establish a high degree of legitimacy for itself. Hence the sense of imbalance between the justification (the reasoning) and the outcome. In this particular case, the tension between the tone of the argument and the outcome may be seen as placating, in advance, the political forces behind the petitioners;
those upset by what they saw as the "surrender of sovereignty" resulting from accession to the
EU.
This interpretation is all the more tempting since, around the time the Polish Constitutional Tribunal issued its Accession Treaty Judgment, it had also issued another, equally well publicized and hotly anticipated, EU-related judgment, namely the decision on the European Arrest Warrant (EAW). 86 From the point of view of the "strategy of reassurance" rhetoric described earlier, the EAW decision may be seen as a mirror image of the Accession Treaty decision. The applicability of the EAW in Poland was invalidated as unconstitutional, 87 but this "Europe-unfriendly" result was reached through a rationale which displayed a great sensitivity as regards the duties of Poland towards its new partners in the EU and the principle 87 The decision was triggered by a "legal question" from a regional court as to whether the provision of the code of criminal procedure, implementing the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) Framework Decision was consistent with the express constitutional prohibition against the "extradition" of Polish nationals. The Tribunal stated that while the Polish legislator has a constitutional duty to implement framework decisions, this duty does not preclude constitutional scrutiny of the conformity of European secondary law with the Polish Constitution. In this case, the "surrender" under the EAW rules was found by the Tribunal to be equivalent to the concept of "extradition" as used in the Constitution, and so the explicit constitutional ban on extradition prevailed over the statutory implementation of the EAW Framework Decision. At the same time, the Tribunal suspended the effects of its decision for 18 months in order to give the legislator enough time to sort out the conflict, for instance by amending the Constitution.
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of supremacy of EU law over national legal orders. 88 In fact, none of the harsh assertions for national sovereignty and of the primacy of the Polish constitution over European law, so strikingly present in the Accession Treaty judgment, can be found in the judgment on the EAW. 89 The Tribunal even maintained the validity of the extradition procedures for the maximum period possible (18 months) thus enabling the legislator to cope with the situation, and more importantly, hinting at the need to remove the constitutional prohibition on extradition -which was eventually done by constitutional amendment on the 8 of September
2006. In addition, it stated explicitly that the implementation of the EAW would be beneficial to Poland as it would contribute to the "strengthening of its internal security". 90 So the overall tenor of the EAW Decision is: "We really hate what we are doing but we have no choice". 90 Point 5.9 of the EAW Decision. 91 As always, the judicial rhetoric about an alleged impossibility of any other decision due to plain textual meaning of the constitutional provision has to be taken with a grain of salt. There were various options available to the Tribunal in order to distinguish constitutional "extradition" from surrender, as defined by the EAW; for example under the constitutionally mandated limits on constitutional rights based on the necessity to protect democracy, public security or public order (such an argument had actually been submitted to the Tribunal during the proceedings, see Point 4.1 of the Decision P 1/05), or as I would suggest (though I could find no traces of such an interpretation produced by anyone before the proceedings), on the basis of a purposive interpretation of the constitutional ban on extradition, namely that it was motivated by the fear that the extradition of Polish citizens could be used as a political weapon against the 'undesirables', but that when no such danger occurs, the reluctance to surrender Polish citizens to another country is unfounded. Whether such an interpretation is convincing is besides the point here; all that matters is that the Tribunal, as always, faced a choice rather than being forced to pronounce the "right answer" allegedly predetermined by the text of the Constitution.
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the Polish constitution, and in particular its requirements concerning democracy and human rights, and thirdly, implicit but obvious, that the Court will be the guardian charged with assessing whether these limits have, or not, been breached. This is precisely what Solange was all about.
The view according to which the national constitution is above EU law and that the Constitutional Court is a guardian of this primacy seems to be firmly set in the minds of Polish constitutional judges. This comes across not only in their judgments but also in the extra-judicial pronouncements. A few months after the Tribunal handed down its Accession
Treaty judgment, the judge who had authored the judgment, Marian Grzybowski, a prominent constitutional-law scholar, presented a paper at an international conference, where he made assertions precisely to that effect: a "constitutional regulation" is "superior" to EU law, and the constitutional court is a guarantor of this superiority. 30 that supremacy does not apply to the powers transferred to the EU. 94 It could have also distinguished between the notion of "extradition" within the Polish Constitution and that of "surrender" in the statutory rules implementing the EAW, thus avoiding the conflict between the two. 95 As to the second point, the force of a provision must be seen as something external to the actual contents of this provision: it would be incoherent to believe that a particular provision of an act can authoritatively determine how important this act will be vis-à-vis other legal sources, because we would then run into an infinite regress: there must be some external criterion to assess the importance of a given law vis-à-vis other laws. So the Constitutional Tribunal had to decide about how to position the legal status of the national constitution vis-à-vis other legal orders, and while the choice that it made is an understandable one, it cannot be seen as the only one available to it.
The other side of the coin
A Hungarian scholar noted recently with a certain resignation that "except for a few constitutional court decisions which are notorious for purportedly putting obstacles in the way of European integration and EU-driven constitutional transformation, constitutional courts go almost unnoticed in EU matters". 96 At first glance, this observation, especially if combined with the account, earlier in this article, of the CEE constitutional courts writing "chapter 3" of Solange, may give only a one-sided account of the phenomenon captured by the triangle "CEE constitutional courts -EU law -democracy". For while it is true that a strong insistence on the courts' right to enforce constitutionally driven limits against the supremacy of EU law brings to the forefront the spectre of the paradox highlighted in the introduction (namely, that the courts place democracy-justified limits on an integration, which had been justified, inter alia, by the need to consolidate democracy), on the other hand those same courts appeal sometimes to democratic and rights-related standards of the EU (not to mention the Council of Europe) in order to reinforce their arguments about democratic consolidation in their own countries. True, they do not normally do so in contexts in which the issues of the supremacy and direct effect of EU law are raised, but the full picture of EU-related resources used by constitutional courts in their rulings on democracy must include also this part of the story. [t]he state of free expression is a clear indicator of the level of democracy. The fewer obstacles are placed in the way of opinions formed and expressed, the more stable is constitutional democracy. In a really free society, the expression of extreme views does not cause disturbances, but it rather contributes to the development of public peace and order as well as to the improvement of people's level of tolerance.
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In its judgment, the Court found fault in two aspects of the proposed amendment to the Criminal Code: first, that it replaced the older "incitement to hatred" with the "provoking hatred" standard, and secondly, that it included "disparagement" as a punishable offence. Id., Part II, 1.1. 100 Id., Part II.1.1. 101 The challenged amendments provided: "Section 269 (1) Anyone who in front of a large public gathering provokes hatred or calls for committing a forcible act against any nation or any national, ethnic, racial or religious group, or against any group among the population, commits a felony and is to be punished by imprisonment for a period of up to three years. 2) Anyone who hurts human dignity in front of a large public gathering by disparaging or humiliating others on the basis of national, ethnic,
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As to the first formula, "provoking hatred", the Court found that it "lowers the threshold of culpability" as compared to the earlier, "incitement to hatred" formula, because it may be found even when there is no direct "whipping up of intense emotions" leading to a disturbance of peace; further, "provoking" engages the hearer's mind while "incitement" acts on instincts and emotions. 102 As to the second point, the Court found that, while "disparagement" is indeed a violation of human dignity, it does not require recourse to criminal sanctions, and therefore that criminalization is a disproportionate restriction on freedom of expression. 103 Overall, it is a highly civil-libertarian judgment, even reasserting verbatim the famous formula, developed in the US 1 st Amendment jurisprudence, of "clear and present danger" as a test for punishable crimes of offensive expression. The Court devotes the following paragraph to this matter:
It is the aim of the draft framework decision on action against racism and xenophobia proposed by the Commission of the European Union to enhance the efficiency of the Member States' legislation on combating racism, although at the session of the European Union's Justice and Home Affairs Council, where the draft framework decision was put forward, several Member States expressed reservations that resulted in the presidency proposing the amendment of the text of the draft framework decision. Accordingly, a reference is to be made in the text to Article 6 of the Treaty on the European Union and the framework decision should guarantee the maintenance of the Member States' constitutional principles and values.
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This reference to the draft framework decision can be read both as taking inspiration from EU emerging law on the matter as well as an attempt to influence developments on this issue at racial or religious identity commits a misdemeanour and is to be punished by imprisonment for a period of up to two years" (emphases added). The italicized words were challenged by the President, and eventually found unconstitutional by the Court. 
Conclusions
As all EU law scholars know, the principle of supremacy of EC/EU law has two faces.
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Viewed from the perspective of the evolving case law of the ECJ, the supremacy of Community law is full and absolute, whatever the status of the national legal act: when the latter (even if it is of constitutional rank) conflicts with Community law, Community law must prevail, and it is the duty of national courts to set the conflicting national norm aside. On the other hand, from the perspective of Member States, and in particular of national constitutional courts, the perception is quite different, and the mandate of the ECJ to establish its own supremacy over the authoritative doctrines governing the relationship between the law of the EU and that of the Member-States is question-begging: "to put it bluntly, the ECJ can say whatever it wants, the real question is why anyone should heed it". 128 This question has become equivalent to an answer, and indeed the proposition that Community law "has absolute primacy, even over national constitutional provisions, is generally not accepted by national supreme courts". Overall, this is not a picture of an audacious judicial defiance in the face of Europe. But nor is it a picture of a timid deference towards the ECJ's doctrine of supremacy (which could be soon transformed into a constitutional principle of supremacy, if a Constitutional Treaty enters into force, in its current or in a transformed version), 130 and it certainly has the capacity to upset the smooth evolutions carried out by the ECJ on the relationship between national and Community law.
131 130 Art. I-6 of the proposed Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe provides: "The Constitution and law adopted by the institutions of the Union in exercising competences conferred on it shall have primacy over the law of the Member States". 131 Perhaps at this point I should state that, in this paper, I have deliberately put to the side the issue of whether constitutional courts see themselves as "courts" under Art. 234 of the EC Treaty, for the purpose of referring preliminary questions to the ECJ. While this question -notoriously contested in the theory and practice of Western European constitutional courts, is an important one, so far CEE constitutional courts have left this question unanswered: the prevailing answer seems to be a tentative "yes", but no practical consequences have followed from it at this point. 
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Charter of Rights, to be incorporated into the Constitution), the less there will be a reason to legitimately fear the intrusion of the European executives into the life of European citizens.
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But then there is a second possible take on the developments discussed in this paper, and (while both perspectives are mutually compatible), this second way of making sense of the phenomenon of "Solange, chapter 3" seems to me to be more illuminating and to account better for the approaches adopted by constitutional courts in the region. 134 
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of parliamentary laws, either ex ante or right after the law has been passed, and on instigation of the disgruntled minority. While they like to present themselves as "courts" and as part of the "judicial" branch, the legitimacy problem of these courts consists in that when they take on a quasi-legislative role, they can count very little on the force of legitimating arguments deriving from the imagery of a judicial, impartial umpire resolving specific conflicts between two parties.
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Indeed, the exalted position of constitutional courts within domestic political systems is not particularly stable and cannot be comfortably taken for granted: partly for the right reasons 
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"judicial activism", which he has dubbed (using approvingly the concept coined by Robert H. Bork) as "judicial imperialism", and which he finds antithetical to the principles of democracy. He also declared that it "leads to the rule of lawyers instead of the rule of law". 150 The general public opinion often seems to be supporting the President in this contest. 151 The Hungarian Court escaped, happily, the bad fortunes of its Polish and Czech counterparts, 152 perhaps because (in the opinion of many Hungarian observers) it adopted a much more passive, perhaps even deferential approach towards the executive. So, according to this perspective, the constitutional courts' resistance towards the supremacy of European law can be well explained by their attempt to reinforce their domestic interinstitutional position, especially in the face of challenges and threats, real and imagined, from the other governmental branches. There is nothing puzzling about an institution adopting whatever argumentative strategy it can find to consolidate and increase its power. But here comes the final paradox, in addition to the democracy paradox noted in the opening paragraphs of this paper. The democracy paradox, if I may recall it, consisted of the fact that the very argument (consolidation of democracy), which had served to justify the accession to the Union, may now be used against a smooth legal integration within the Union. The last paradox is about Europe as a legitimating myth for constitutional courts. One of the hypotheses about the sources of the impressive strengthening of the power of constitutional courts was that they were legitimated by their being so "European". 153 While the argument (made occasionally) 154 that part of the implicit political acquis was to have a strong and 43 independent constitutional court is probably a nonsense (there is no uniformity across the rest of EU-land when it comes to the model of constitutional review), it may well be the case that there has been a perception that it is part and parcel of a properly functioning European State.
The constitutional courts in CEE have undoubtedly been much more pro-European than any average citizen: their judges are highly educated, affluent, often with the satisfying experiences of studies or work in the West, lawyers (more often than not, legal scholars).
They easily fit the profile of a "pro-European" CEE citizen. There is much anecdotal evidence that lawyers who staff and surround constitutional courts in CEE are no Eurosceptic. And yet, for all the reasons suggested above, they may now be an obstacle in the alignment of the constitutional orders of the Member States with the EU-wide constitutional order. This would be the real irony of Solange, chapter 3.
